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Abstract 
The present work introduces a computational model, the Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) 
model, which demonstrates that contingency learning achieved via simple storage and retrieval 
of episodic memories can explain the item-specific proportion congruency effect in the colour-
word Stroop paradigm. The current work also presents a new experimental procedure to more 
directly dissociate contingency biases from conflict adaptation (i.e., proportion congruency). 
This was done with three different types of incongruent words that allow a comparison of: (a) 
high versus low contingency while keeping proportion congruency constant, and (b) high versus 
low proportion congruency while keeping contingency constant. Results demonstrated a 
significant contingency effect, but no effect of proportion congruence. It was further shown that 
the proportion congruency associated with the colour does not matter, either. Thus, the results 
quite directly demonstrate that ISPC effects are not due to conflict adaptation, but instead to 
contingency learning biases. 
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The Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) Model: Dissociating Contingency and Conflict 
Adaptation in the Item-Specific Proportion Congruent Paradigm 
 For decades, one of the most popular ideas in the cognitive psychology literature is the 
idea that participants are able to adapt to conflict encountered in performance tasks such as the 
Stroop by adjusting attention away from the source of conflict. Perhaps the most popular 
instance of purported conflict adaptation is the proportion congruent effect. In the Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935), participants are slower to identify the colour of a colour word when the word is 
incongruent (e.g., the word RED printed in blue; REDblue) relative to when it is congruent (e.g., 
REDred). This congruency effect is larger when the proportion of congruent trials in the task is 
high (e.g., 75% congruent, 25% incongruent) relative to when the proportion of congruent trials 
is low (e.g., 25% congruent, 75% incongruent; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982). This interaction between 
congruency and proportion congruency, termed the proportion congruent (PC) effect, is 
generally interpreted as evidence of conflict adaptation (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). Specifically, it is argued 
that the congruency effect is smaller in the low PC condition because participants detect that 
most of the trials in the task are conflictual (i.e., incongruent) and thus direct their attention away 
from the distracting word to avoid further conflict. As a result, the word has less impact on 
performance, resulting in a smaller Stroop effect. 
 Although the conflict adaptation idea is highly intuitive there are reasons to doubt this 
explanation of the proportion congruent effect. One challenge was presented by Jacoby, Lindsay, 
and Hessels (2003) when they introduced an item-specific version of the proportion congruency 
paradigm. Instead of manipulating PC between-participant or between-block, they manipulated 
PC across items. For example, BLUE and GREEN may have been presented most often in their 
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congruent colour (high PC), whereas RED and ORANGE might have been presented most often 
in their incongruent colour (low PC). Participants produced a larger congruency effect for high 
relative to low PC items, what has been termed an item-specific proportion congruent (ISPC) 
effect. The ISPC effect poses some difficulty for the conflict adaptation account. If participants 
are detecting how much conflict they encounter in the task, then it is not clear how they would be 
able to adapt to conflict differently for high versus low PC items, which are intermixed in the 
task. Although claims have been forwarded that participants can learn the conflict associated 
with individual items and rapidly adjust attention accordingly (e.g., Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & 
Besner, 2007; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008), there is another potential explanation that does not 
rely on conflict adaptation at all. 
 A drastically different interpretation of the ISPC effect (and PC effects in general) was 
presented by Schmidt and colleagues (Schmidt & Besner, 2008; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & 
Besner, 2007; see also, Mordkoff, 1996). According to these authors, participants might simply 
be learning the contingencies between distracting words and responses to the colour. Participants 
then respond faster to these high contingency trials (i.e., where the word is predictive of the 
correct response) relative to low contingency trials (i.e., where the word is not predictive of the 
correct response). In non-conflict tasks, such contingency effects are found to be quite reliable 
(see Schmidt, 2012). For example, Miller (1987; see also Carlson & Flowers, 1996) found that 
when distracting letter flankers were predictive of the target letter, high contingency trials are 
faster than low contingency trials. Similarly, Schmidt and colleagues (2007) found a contingency 
effect when distracting neutral words were predictive of the colour they were printed in (e.g., 
MOVE most often in blue). Such contingency biases can explain the ISPC effect. For example, if 
GREEN is presented most often in green, then the word GREEN is accurately predictive of the 
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green response. Thus, congruent trials in the high PC condition will be speeded, leading to a 
larger Stroop effect. Similarly, if RED is presented most often in yellow, then RED is accurately 
predictive of the yellow response. Thus, incongruent trials will be speeded in the low PC 
condition leading to a smaller Stroop effect. It can therefore be seen that contingency biases 
alone will produce a congruency by proportion congruency interaction (i.e., PC effect). Note that 
response conflict is still assumed to exist according to the contingency account, but the changes 
in the size of the Stroop effect with differing levels of PC has to do with the predictive 
relationships between words are responses and not due to variation in conflict per se. 
 Schmidt and Besner (2008) suggested that participants learn the predictive relationships 
(i.e., contingencies) between words and responses to prepare for the likely (i.e., high 
contingency) response. In particular, they suggested that participants calculate the expected 
response based on the identity of the word and use this response prediction to decrease the 
response threshold of the predicted response. An even simpler explanation is that “contingency 
learning” is simply a by-product of memory storage and retrieval processes (see Schmidt, De 
Houwer, & Besner, 2010). Specifically, on each trial participants encode information about what 
stimuli (word and colour) were presented along with what response was made into an episodic 
memory. On subsequent trials, presentation of the word will lead to retrieval of past episodes of 
when this word was presented, which then directly facilitate the high contingency response 
associated with these episodes. The Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) model, described in the 
section to follow, does exactly this. 
 The PEP model will provide computational support for this new episodic retrieval 
account of the ISPC effect. In addition, the PEP model will be used to investigate an important 
question about additivity. Specifically, Schmidt and Besner (2008) argued that contingency and 
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congruency effects are due to statistically-independent processes and should generally not 
interact with each other. This paper will argue that this additivity prediction is mistaken. 
However, the argument that Schmidt and Besner put forward is that the high contingency 
congruent (high PC) and incongruent (low PC) trials will both be responded to roughly equally 
faster than low contingency congruent (low PC) and incongruent (high PC) trials, respectively. 
As a result, the benefit of high contingency is equivalent for congruent and incongruent trials, 
meaning that contingency and congruency should not interact. Schmidt and Besner provided data 
consistent with this notion. These additivity predictions contrast sharply with those that would be 
expected from a conflict adaptation account that should anticipate all fluctuation in the size of 
the congruency effect to be due to changes in incongruent (and not congruent) trials, given that 
the Stroop effect is almost entirely an interference phenomenon (e.g., see MacLeod, 1991, for a 
review). Schmidt and Besner thus suggested that the interaction pattern (i.e., additive vs. 
interaction) could be used to distinguish between contingency learning and conflict adaptation. 
 The additive pattern of data observed by Schmidt and Besner (2008) is indeed 
problematic for the conflict adaptation account of the ISPC when observed. However, there is a 
problem with the prediction that contingency and congruency should always be additive. Even if 
it is true that contingency and congruency effects are due to independent processes, it does not 
necessarily follow that the two effects will be perfectly additive (and, indeed, they are not in all 
task variants; e.g., Bugg, Jacoby, & Chanani, 2011). For example, incongruent trials take longer 
to respond to than congruent trials, so there is more time on an incongruent trial for 
contingencies to bias responding relative to a congruent trial. This would result in a larger 
contingency effect for incongruent relative to congruent trials, producing an overadditive 
interaction.1 Thus, even if the contingency account of ISPC effects is correct, deviation from the 
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additive pattern Schmidt and Besner demonstrated is likely, particularly with higher power 
experiments and in situations that promote this sort of overadditive interaction (e.g., where 
responses to congruent trials are restricted by a floor effect). In this vein, a second goal of 
Simulation 1 is to see whether a model that produces an ISPC effect via contingency learning 
processes rather than conflict adaptation produces results that deviate from additivity. 
Stimulation 1 
 A visual representation of the PEP model is presented in Figure 1. A simplified 
explanation of the model is explained in the text to follow, but for interested readers a complete 
conceptual overview and description of the math of the model is presented in the Appendix. 
Fully documented source code is available online (http://users.ugent.be/~jaschmid/PEP/) or from 
the author. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 The primary goal of Simulation 1 is to demonstrate that a very simple episodic memory 
model can account for the ISPC effect. On each trial, the model creates a new episode, which is 
linked to activated words. Activation from word and colour Input nodes competes in Identity 
nodes, thus producing a congruency effect. Words also activate Episode nodes, which in turn 
activate Response nodes (note that colours are not linked to episodes for computational 
simplicity only). As the episodes associated with a particular word are most often associated with 
a specific (high contingency) response, these processes result in the high contingency Response 
node being active, thus producing a contingency effect. The model has no mechanism by which 
it can learn about and adapt to conflict. Response conflict does occur in the model (i.e., if two or 
more Identity nodes are active, then they will compete), but the model is unable to measure this 
conflict (conflict monitoring) or adjust attention or other processing in response to conflict 
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(conflict adaptation). 
Method 
 Simulation 1 was basically identical to the design of Jacoby and colleagues (2003). There 
were four pairs of colours. High and low PC trials were completed in one run and medium PC 
trials were completed in a second run (they were two separate blocks in original experiment). In 
the first of these two runs, two of the words were presented three of four times in their congruent 
colour (high PC) and once in the other (incongruent) colour, whereas the other two words were 
presented three of four times in a specific incongruent colour (low PC) and once in their 
congruent colour. In the second run, two pairs of words were presented equally often (two of 
four times) in both the congruent and incongruent colour (medium PC). The model was run 1000 
times (i.e., 1000 “participants”), with 16 trials in each of 30 blocks, for a total of 480 trials. 
Results 
 Cycle times. The results of Simulation 1 can be seen in Figure 2. The PEP produced an 
overall congruency effect of 89 cycles. The model also produced an ISPC effect: the congruency 
effect was 117 cycles in the high PC condition, 90 cycles in the medium PC condition, and 61 
cycles in the low PC condition. Most importantly, deviation from additivity was apparent. When 
the results were plotted as a function of contingency (Figure 2b) rather than PC, the congruency 
effect was 68, 90, and 110 cycles in the high, medium, and low contingency conditions, 
respectively. Thus, an overadditive interaction was observed. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 Error percentages. The error data for Simulation 1 are presented in Figure 3. The model 
produced an overall congruency effect of 2.2%. The model also produced an ISPC effect: the 
congruency effect was 2.7% in the high PC condition, 2.2% in the medium PC condition, and 
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1.7% in the low PC condition. Most importantly, deviation from additivity was again observed. 
When the results were plotted as a function of contingency rather than PC, the congruency effect 
was 1.9, 2.2, and 2.5% in the high, medium, and low contingency conditions, respectively. Thus, 
an overadditive interaction was again observed. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
Discussion 
 The results of Simulation 1 demonstrate two things. First, memory encoding and retrieval 
processes are sufficient to produce an ISPC effect. Like conflict monitoring models (e.g., Blais et 
al., 2007; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008), the PEP successfully simulated the ISPC effect in both 
cycle times and error percentages. Thus, conflict monitoring and adaptation do not need to be 
assumed to simulate the ISPC effect. Second, the results were not perfectly additive. 
Specifically, the contingency effect was larger for incongruent relative to congruent trials. As 
discussed in the introduction, this is due to the fact that contingency has more time to influence 
responding on incongruent relative to congruent trials. The degree to which the results do or do 
not deviate from additivity can be altered by playing with parameters, many of which might 
correspond to differences between experiments (e.g., speeding target identification, similar to 
Bugg et al., 2011). Deviation from additivity was also found with an earlier version of the model 
that more closely corresponded to the response threshold idea of Schmidt and Besner (2008). 
Thus, the contingency account of the ISPC can tolerate such overadditive interactions, contrary 
to what Schmidt and Besner suggest. An interaction between contingency and congruency 
cannot therefore be used to argue against a contingency account, as Schmidt and Besner 
previously suggested. Thus, a new dissociation procedure is required to distinguish between 
conflict adaptation and contingency. 
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Experiment 1 
 Schmidt and Besner (2008) previously argued that additive results support the 
contingency account and overadditive results support the conflict adaptation account. Simulation 
1 demonstrates that this is not necessarily true. Logically, independent processes do not entail 
additive data and Simulation 1 clearly demonstrated that the contingency account can tolerate 
non-additivity. Given that overadditivity is also consistent with conflict adaptation theory, it is 
difficult to interpret such non-additive patterns. For example, if one finds an overadditive 
interaction driven solely by incongruent trials, then is this another contingency bias or legitimate 
conflict adaptation? A new approach is therefore needed. 
 A more direct approach to assessing contingency biases in the ISPC task is to dissociate 
item-level proportion congruence from contingency. This was the goal of Experiment 1. As can 
be seen in Table 1, the design had four colour words, two of which were high PC (BLUE and 
GREEN) and two of which were low PC (RED and YELLOW). Critically, some of the low PC 
incongruent items were high contingency (e.g., REDyellow), whereas others were low contingency 
(e.g., REDblue). These manipulations allow the creation of three incongruent trial types, each 
shaded differently in Table 1: (1) high contingency/low PC (high/low) such as REDyellow, (2) low 
contingency/low PC (low/low) such as REDblue, and (3) low contingency/high PC (low/high) 
such as BLUEgreen. In most ISPC designs, only high/low and low/high incongruent trials are 
present, thus directly confounding contingency and PC. The inclusion of the low/low 
incongruent trials is thus critical in dissociating contingency and PC effects. Specifically, the 
high/low and low/low incongruent trials vary only in contingency (i.e., they are both low PC), 
making a difference between the two evidence for a contingency learning contribution to the 
ISPC effect. In contrast, low/low and low/high incongruent trials vary only in PC (i.e., they are 
CONTINGENCY AND CONFLICT ADAPTATION 11 
both low contingency), making a difference between the two evidence for conflict adaptation. 
(Table 1 about here) 
 Recently, Bugg and colleagues (2011) have suggested that sometimes the proportion 
congruency of the colour (rather than the word) might matter. Although the experimental setup 
of the current experiment is probably not ideal for matching the parameters suggested by those 
authors for when colour PC might matter (specifically, when the colour has a processing 
advantage over the word), a dissociation of colour PC independent of word PC (i.e., the typical 
PC measure) and contingency was provided. This was achieved by separating low/high 
incongruent trials into two subtypes. Of the six low/high incongruent trials in Table 1, it can be 
seen that two of these have a high PC colour (i.e., BLUEgreen and GREENblue), whereas the 
remaining four have a low PC colour (i.e., BLUEred, BLUEyellow, GREENred, and GREENyellow). 
Both of these trial types are low contingency and have a high PC word (i.e., BLUE or GREEN), 
so they vary only in the PC of the colour. Thus, these manipulations allow an assessment of 
contingency, word PC, and colour PC independently. 
Method 
 Participants. Fifty Ghent University undergraduates participated in exchange for course 
credit. 
 Apparatus. Stimulus and response timing were controlled by E-Prime software 
(Psychology Software Tools, 2002). Responses were made on an AZERTY keyboard. 
 Materials and Design. Stimuli were presented on a black background. There were four 
Dutch colour words (blauw [blue], groen [green], rood [red], and geel [yellow]) presented in the 
same four display colours (blue, green, red, and yellow). Words were presented in lowercase, 
bold, 18 pt. Courier New font. The RGB values for the colours were 0,0,255 (blue), 0,255,0 
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(green), 255,0,0 (red), and 255,255,0 (yellow). A total of 400 stimuli were selected randomly 
with replacement. Two colour words were presented 70% of the time in their congruent colour 
(high/high congruent) and equally often in the remaining three colours (low/high incongruent). 
The other two colour words were presented 70% of the time in the other low PC colour 
(high/low incongruent) and equally often in the remaining three colours (low/low congruent and 
incongruent). 
 Procedure. Participants sat approximately 60 cm from the screen. They were first 
presented with a white fixation (“+”) for 250 ms, followed by a blank screen for 750 ms, 
followed by the Stroop stimulus for 2000 ms or until a response was made. The next trial began 
immediately after correct responses. Trials on which an error was made or the participant failed 
to respond in time were followed by “XXX” in white for 500 ms before the next trial. Responses 
were made with the U, I, O, and P keys. Which colour was mapped to which key was randomly 
determined for each participant. The PC level associated with each colour was also randomized. 
Which keys corresponded to high or low PC colours was counterbalanced across participants. 
Results 
 Correct response latencies and errors were analysed. Two participants were dropped from 
the analysis for failing to comply with instructions. One had almost 100% errors in the three 
incongruent conditions, indicating that they were responding to the word rather than the colour. 
The second participant that was deleted made the same mistake for the first half of the 
experiment and resultantly had over 50% errors in the three incongruent conditions. 
 Response Latencies. First, the ISPC effect was assessed in the traditional way by 
performing a 2 congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) x 2 PC (high vs. low) ANOVA. 
Unsurprisingly, there was a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,47) = 147.474, MSE = 
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2477, p < .001, 2pη  = .76, indicating slower overall responses to incongruent trials. There was no 
main effect of PC, F(1,47) = .025, MSE = 3498, p = .874, 2pη  < .001. Critically, there was a 
significant interaction between congruency and PC (i.e., an ISPC effect), F(1,47) = 21.444, MSE 
= 2612, p < .001, 2pη  = .31. 
 Next, the three types of incongruent trials were divided up and the two critical tests were 
completed. Responses were significantly faster to high/low (775 ms) relative to low/low (815 
ms) incongruent trials, t(47) = 3.409, SEdiff = 12, p = .001, 2pη  = .20, indicating a significant 
contingency effect. In contrast, no difference was found between low/low and low/high (818 ms) 
incongruent trials, t(47) = .319, SEdiff = 10, p = .751, 2pη  < .01, indicating no evidence for conflict 
adaptation. Further, this test had high power (.98) to detect an effect as large as the observed 
contingency effect. The potential effect of the PC of the colour was then assessed by separating 
low/high incongruent trials and no significant difference was found between high PC colours 
(815 ms) and low PC colours (820 ms), t(47) = .302, SEdiff = 17, p = .764, 2pη  < .01. Indeed the 
means were numerically in the wrong direction. Finally, high/high congruent trials (697 ms) 
were responded to significantly faster than low/low congruent trials (730 ms), t(47) = 2.437, 
SEdiff = 13, p = .019, 2pη  = .11, consistent with either account. 
 Error Percentages. The 2 congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) x 2 PC (high vs. low) 
ANOVA for errors revealed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,47) = 17.985, MSE = 
25, p < .001, 2pη  = .28, indicating more errors overall for incongruent trials. There was no main 
effect of PC, F(1,47) = .599, MSE = 15, p = .443, 2pη  = .01. Critically, there was a significant 
interaction between congruency and PC (i.e., an ISPC effect), F(1,47) = 10.323, MSE = 15, p = 
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.002, 2pη  = .18. 
 The errors were generally less sensitive than the response latencies. There were no 
significant differences between high/low (7.2%) and low/low (7.7%) incongruent trials, t(47) = 
.476, SEdiff = 1.0, p = .637, 2pη  < .01, low/low and low/high (9.5%) incongruent trials, t(47) = 
1.823, SEdiff = 1.0, p = .075, 2pη  = .07, high PC colours (9.5%) and low PC colours (9.6%), t(47) 
= .095, SEdiff = 1.1, p = .925, 2pη  < .001, or high/high (4.6%) and low/low congruent trials 
(6.0%), t(47) = 1.489, SEdiff = .9, p = .143, 2pη  = .05. Thus, errors were largely uninformative. 
Discussion 
 The results of the Experiment 1 found clear support for the contingency account of ISPC 
effects and no support for conflict adaptation. Support for the contingency account was found in 
the observation of a contingency learning effect when PC was controlled for (i.e., high/low vs. 
low/low). A difference between these two conditions can only be attributable to contingency 
learning. Hutchison (2011) recently performed a similar test in verbal Stroop data, where a 
contingency learning contribution was also confirmed.2 Experiment 1 also tested for a 
contribution of the item-level PC of the word (i.e., low/low vs. low/high). The conflict adaptation 
account would predict greater interference for low/high relative to low/low incongruent trials, 
but no difference was observed.3 Furthermore, the PC of the colour also did not affect 
performance. 
General Discussion 
 This work provides three key new contributions. First, Simulation 1 with the Parallel 
Episodic Processing (PEP) model demonstrates that very simple memory storage and retrieval 
processes can produce an ISPC effect. The processes involved in this model are even simpler 
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than the response prediction and threshold adjustment ideas of Schmidt and Besner (2008). All 
the model does is store episodic memories of trials (i.e., memories of the stimuli and responses 
that occurred on the trial) and then retrieve these memories on subsequent trials. These highly 
simple processes were sufficient to produce an ISPC effect. Of course, sufficiency does not 
prove that contingencies are the whole story. Conflict monitoring models can also produce the 
ISPC effect (Blais et al., 2007; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008) and the current simulation does not 
preclude the possibility that both contingency and conflict monitoring biases are present in the 
task. Experiment 1, however, has more to say on that point. 
 In addition to providing an existence proof that episodic memory biases can produce an 
ISPC effect without appealing to the notion of conflict adaptation, the PEP model makes a 
second key contribution. The results of Simulation 1 show that contingency learning biases are 
not necessarily always additive with congruency. Instead, contingency effects will often be larger 
for incongruent relative to congruent trials. This is because contingency has more time to affect 
behaviour on incongruent trials. Indeed, finding parameters that allow for additive-looking data 
was challenging. This might indicate that some deviation from additivity will always be present 
(but not necessarily big enough to detect statistically). Alternatively, it could simply mean that 
the current configuration of the PEP model is too cascaded. A change in the rules of how 
activation is passed from one set of nodes to another could affect the degree of additivity. In 
future work, investigating such parameters might prove important. For the current work, it is 
sufficient to point out that contingency learning can produce overadditive effects of contingency 
and congruency. 
 Even if contingency learning and Stroop conflict are due to independent processes, it 
does not follow that their effects will be additive, contrary to what Schmidt and Besner (2008) 
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suggested. It may, however, be that congruency and contingency effects are at least roughly 
additive in many experimental setups. This is because contingencies affect both congruent and 
incongruent trials. An overadditive interaction only occurs to the extent that contingencies affect 
congruent and incongruent trials to a different magnitude. When additive data is observed, it is 
difficult to explain such results within the context of a conflict adaptation account of ISPC 
effects. Specifically, it is unclear why increased attention to the word should have any beneficial 
effect for congruent trials when the Stroop effect is known to be almost (or perhaps completely) 
attributable to interference and not facilitation (see MacLeod, 1991, for a review). However, 
deviation from strict additivity is likely in many situations even if the contingency account of 
ISPC effects is correct. This fact forces a different approach to distinguish contingency biases 
from conflict adaptation (i.e., one that does not rely on determining the interaction type). 
 Related to this, the third key contribution of this work is a more effective way of 
distinguishing between contingency learning and conflict adaptation. Rather than relying on the 
interaction pattern (i.e., additive vs. interactive), Experiment 1 used a dissociation procedure in 
order to assess contingency learning and conflict adaptation biases separately. This analysis 
found evidence for contingency learning, but not for conflict adaptation. Thus, the present results 
suggest that conflict adaptation effects do not occur in the ISPC task, or are very small and 
difficult to observe. Given this low reliability, it is unclear whether the ISPC paradigm is a 
suitable metric for studying conflict adaptation. It is also challenging to completely control for 
contingency biases. For example, while Experiment 1 determined a way to deconfound 
incongruent trials, congruent trials are inherently confounded: high PC congruent words are high 
contingency and low PC congruent words are low contingency (for similar problems with the 
Gratton paradigm, see Schmidt & De Houwer, 2011). 
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 It is important to highlight the fact that the current work concerns itself with item-specific 
proportion congruent effects. Recent work has indicated that list-level proportion congruent 
effects are also observable (e.g., Hutchison, 2011). That is, after accounting for item-specific 
learning, participants are responsive to the proportion of congruent trials in the task as a whole. 
List-level PC effects cannot be explained by a contingency learning mechanism. It could 
therefore still be the case that list-level PC effects are driven by conflict adaptation (but see, 
Schmidt & De Schryver, 2012). List-level conflict adaptation would not require the same rapid, 
trial-by-trial shifts in attention proposed for item-level conflict adaptation and thus might be 
more psychologically plausible. 
 On a similar note, context-level conflict adaptation might also be possible in some 
situations (e.g., Bugg, Jacoby, & Toth, 2008; Crump, Gong, & Milliken, 2006). That is, a 
contextual cue such as stimulus font could serve as a cue to conflict. Context-level conflict 
adaptation might be possible because participants can use a rapidly-processed initial distracting 
cue (e.g., font) to determine the PC associated with another distracting cue (e.g., word). This sort 
of conflict adaptation would be much different (and probably easier) than using a distracting cue 
(e.g., word) to determine the PC associated with itself as the trial unfolds. Admittedly, item-
specific conflict adaptation accounts seem a bit counterintuitive (e.g., because you determine 
how to attend to something based on its own identity, which obviously cannot be known before 
attending to it), whereas list- or context-level conflict adaptation seems much less unintuitive 
(i.e., because you determine how to attend to something based on separate contextual 
information). Further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities. 
 In summary, this paper argued that interpretation of interaction patterns is a suboptimal 
way of differentiating contingencies and conflict adaptation. Instead, focus on direct 
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dissociations between contingency and PC, such as Experiment 1 in the current paper, is 
desirable for future work. Looking forward, further attempts to uncover previously-unidentified 
confounds in the varied paradigms used for studying conflict adaptation could prove quite 
beneficial to the literature. For example, list-level and context-level PC effects could be due to 
conflict adaptation, but they could also be due to temporal learning (Schmidt & De Schryver, 
2012). Indeed, one of the tough challenges for all researchers publishing in the conflict 
adaptation domain is to explain the inconsistencies between the results that do seem to suggest 
conflict adaptation and the results that fail to find evidence for conflict adaptation when 
confounds are rigorously controlled for. Is conflict adaptation merely context-sensitive? What 
rules determine when it comes and goes? Answering such questions could be highly informative. 
Conflict adaptation theory may yet stand the test of time, though perhaps in a much more 
restricted form than initially thought. 
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Footnotes 
1
 This point was initially included in Schmidt and Besner (2008), but was later regulated to a 
footnote and eventually omitted from the manuscript entirely. 
2
 While Hutchison did not compare high/low and low/low incongruent trials directly, the Stroop 
effects for these incongruent trial types were compared using the same congruent trials as a 
baseline. Thus, this test was effectively identical to the analyses in the current paper. 
3
 The design of Hutchison also had low/high incongruent trials. However, these were not 
directly compared with low/low incongruent trials. Furthermore, such a direct comparison in 
that study could probably be considered questionable given that: (a) the strength of the 
contingencies associated with high and low PC words was not identical, and (b) low PC words 
had above-chance contingencies with both the congruent response and one incongruent 
response, whereas high PC words had above-chance contingencies with only one response 
(i.e., the congruent one). 
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Table 1. Frequency of word colour pairings in Experiment 1. 
 BLUE GREEN RED YELLOW 
blue 7 1 1 1 
green 1 7 1 1 
red 1 1 1 7 
yellow 1 1 7 1 
Note: The three incongruent trial types are shaded (light grey = 
low/high, medium grey = low/low, and dark grey = high/low). 
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Figure 
Figure 1. A pictorial representation of the PEP. Input nodes for colours feed into Identity nodes, 
which then feed into Response nodes. Input nodes for words feed into Episode nodes (one for 
each experienced trial), which then feed into Response nodes, producing contingency learning. 
Input nodes for words also feed into Identity nodes, where word-colour conflict occurs. Note that 
Input nodes for colours are not connected to Episode nodes for simplicity in modelling only (and 
because such connections were not relevant for the current simulation). 
Figure 2. Simulation 1 cycle time data with congruency as a function of (a) proportion 
congruency and (b) contingency. 
Figure 3. Simulation 1 percentage error data with congruency as a function of (a) proportion 
congruency and (b) contingency. 
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Appendix: Model Description 
Input 
 Similar to the conflict monitoring models, the PEP has an Input node for each word and 
each colour. On each processing cycle of each trial, all Input nodes in the PEP receive an input 
that is determined with the formula, 
inputi = (biasi + noise) / 2  (1)  
For each node i, a random bias is set at the beginning of each trial between 0 and .9. The noise 
parameter is randomly determined on each processing cycle as number between 0 and 1. The 
bias parameter is adjusted by .4% on each cycle toward the signal value of .9 for presented items 
and 0 for non-presented items. Thus, the model slowly adjusts toward the correct response over 
time, meaning that over time the model will always give the correct response, but not if speeded 
(i.e., much like actual participants). 
 The input value determined with Formula 1 is used to update the activation state of the 
node on each processing cycle using the formula, 
activationi = activationi(1 – decay) + inputi(decay)  (2)  
Using this formula, activation approaches the value of input across processing cycles. The decay 
parameter was set at .01. Inter-trial intervals of 300 cycles were inserted before each trial, in 
which bias and signal were 0 and noise remained 1. Thus, activation quickly decays during the 
inter-trial interval. 
From Input to Response Nodes 
 For simplicity, colour-to-response mappings are hardwired in the PEP. Colour and word 
Input nodes activate intermediate Identity nodes (again, one for each colour), which then activate 
the Response nodes (one for each response). Both the output from Input to Identity nodes and 
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from Identity to Response nodes is calculated with the formula, 
outputi = (activationi – threshold)(noise)  (3)  
Formula 3, of course, is only calculated when activation > threshold (set at .3). The noise 
parameter was randomly determined on each processing cycle as a value between 0 and 1 for 
word Input nodes, 0 and 6 for colour Input nodes, and 0 and 5 for Identity nodes. As with Input 
nodes, the input value for Identity and Response nodes updates activation with Formula 2. 
Identity nodes also include within-level inhibition of 5% activation of other Identity nodes. This 
within-level inhibition is what produces the congruency effect. 
Episodic Retrieval 
 Word Input nodes retrieve Episode nodes (described in the following section). 
Specifically, word Input nodes with activation exceeding the defined threshold for retrieval (also 
set at .3) activate Episodes using the formula, 
outputi = (activationi – threshold)(m)(strengthx)  (4)  
Activation of word Input nodes exceeding the threshold is multiplied by a multiplier m (set at 6) 
and the connection strength between that word Input node and each Episode x. How these 
connections strengths are determined is explained in the following section. 
Episode Encoding 
 On each trial, the PEP stores a discrete episodic memory (for other episodic models, see 
Estes, 1986; Hintzman, 1984, 1986, 1988; Logan, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 
1988a, 1988b) of the current trial, an Episode node. For each word, a connection strength from 
the word Input node to the current Episode node x is made using the formula, 
strengthx = strengthx(1 – decay) + (activationi – threshold)(decay)  (5)  
The threshold parameter is the same as the retrieval threshold i
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seen, the connection strength between a word and episode is determined by the extent to which 
that word was activated on the trial. For example, if the word MOVE was presented, then the 
MOVE Input node will have a strong link to the current episode. Due to noise, other word Input 
nodes may also have (much weaker) connections to the current episode. Thus, the degree to 
which a word is activated during episode encoding is directly related to the degree to which it 
will later serve as an effective retrieval cue. The strength with which an Episode node is 
connected to each Response node is also calculated with Formula 5, except that the activation 
state of the corresponding Response node is used and there is no threshold. 
Memory Reconsolidation 
 The PEP also performs memory reconsolidation. It is obviously the case that for memory 
to work effectively it needs to be able to adapt as new stimuli are experienced. For example, 
although it may be important to have some memory of the various places you tend to leave your 
keys, it is most important to remember where you left them last. Thus, an important part of 
remembering where your keys are now is (partially) forgetting where you left them before. PEP 
achieves this by inhibiting memories to the extent that they are retrieved using the formula, 
strengthx = strengthx(1 – (activationi – threshold)(decay))  (6)  
The decay parameter for weakening connections is .0001 per cycle and the threshold parameter 
is the same retrieval threshold as in Formulas 4 and 5 (.3). With this formula, the strength value 
of a connection only decreases if activation > threshold. Thus, unlike simple decay, memories 
do not weaken merely as a function of time. Rather, memories are weakened in order to 
accommodate for the encoding of new information. For example, if the word MOVE is presented 
on a trial, then a new MOVE Episode node will be created and old MOVE Episode nodes will be 
weakened. Non-MOVE Episode nodes (e.g., SENT Episode nodes) will not be changed. 
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Although not key for the simulations reported in the current series, this reconsolidation process 
allows the model to rapidly adapt to changes in contingency (e.g., see Schmidt et al., 2010). 
Episode Output 
 Like all episodic models of memory, the PEP does not learn contingencies while it 
performs. Rather, the model simply stores memories of trials as it performs the task. “Learning” 
in an episodic model of memory is what results when information is retrieved from memory. For 
example, when a participant encounters the distracting word MOVE, they will retrieve several 
episodic memory traces in which that word was encountered. Because MOVE was presented 
most often in blue, a large majority of the episodes retrieved will be linked to the blue key 
response. Thus, the simple act of retrieving episodic memories of trials in which MOVE was 
encountered is sufficient to bias the cognitive system toward a blue key response. In the 
computational model, Episode nodes activated above a defined threshold (set at .02) add to the 
output of each response using Formula 4, using the same multiplier (m) of 6 and the connection 
strength that was determined with Formula 6, as described in the previous section. Outputs from 
multiple Episode nodes add up in the output value for a particular response. 
Response Anticipation 
 The output from Episode nodes determined in the previous step is then put into a retrieval 
mechanism. The input from episodic memory to Response nodes is determined with the formula, 
( )








−







−−= ∑
=
1/
1
noutputoutputoutputinput i
n
j
jii   (7)  
Here, i is the current response and nodes 1 to n are the remaining nodes. If the total incoming 
activation from all nodes exceeds 1, then the result of Formula 7 is divided by the total incoming 
activation. A small threshold to correct for random biases is then subtracted (set at .1) and the 
final input is then constrained between 0 and .2. Formula 7 ensures that the input value of a 
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Response node will only increase above zero if the incoming activation is greater than the 
average output to the other Response nodes. This formula allows only the high contingency 
response to become strongly activated. Note that this retrieval mechanism is in some ways 
similar to mechanisms used in other episodic computational models for determining, for 
example, a classification response (e.g., the resonance mechanism of Ratcliff, 1978). 
 
